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Abstract
The paper emphasis the role of unsharpness in the body of Quantum
Theory and the relations to the conceptual problems of the Theory
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In a letter to Heisenberg (1921) Pauli wrote:
”One may view the world with a p-eye (an eye for the momentum space)
and one may view it with a q-eye (an eye for the position space), but if one
opens both eyes simultaneously, one than gets crazy.”
This challenging affirmation is characteristic for a whole ideology raised
on the structure of quantum mechanics. However, nowadays, this became an
old-fashioned ideology; thus, one may reformulate Pauli sentence as:
”One may imagine viewing the world with a p-eye and one may imagine
viewing it with a q-eye, but if one imagine opening both eyes simultaneously,
one than imagine craziness.”
I. The outline of a formal theory of measurement
There are some primitive concepts one need when setting up a formal
theory of experimental-type measurement [1], i.e., system, state, property,
etc. Given a property p one can define a counterproperty p˜, which is false
when p is true and is true when is false. The counterproperty has to be
unique. Always one can define two trivial properties: the truistic one I and
the impossible one O. Of course, O = I˜. A non-trivial property is sharp
if p ∧ p˜ = O (∧ is logical conjunction).I and O are sharp properties. If a
property is not sharp, it is unsharp. If a property is either true or false in a
given state, it is real in that state.
If a collection of properties completely defines a state, it is a complete
observable. Two properties are coexistent if there is a complete observable,
which contains both of them. A collection of coexistent properties defines
a (simple) observable. A measurement is a process used for identifying the
state of a system using a complete observable. If all the properties that
belong to a complete observable are sharp, its measurement is a sharp one.
Two observable are coexistent if there exist a complete observable, which
contains both of them.
II. Classical mechanics
In classical mechanics, the properties are Borel subsets of the phase space
Ω, while states are (normalized) measurable functions on Ω and an observable
is a real-function A : Ω→ R, or, equivalently, the set-function induced by it
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on the set of properties. Using infinite series of properties and a frequencial
definition of the state [1] one may identify the upper definition of a complete
observable. In classical mechanics all properties are sharp (the counterprop-
erty is the set-complement of the corresponding Borel set), and all properties
are mutually coexistent (the presence of a Borel set in the infinite series is
unimportant).
The concept of ”system” does not refer mere to a single physical object
(or a collection of objects), but to a countable ensemble of identical copies
of one single object, while measurement is determination of the normalized
measurable function frequencially defined in that ensemble.
Of course, these are mere ideal definitions; practically one uses finite
number of copies. Nevertheless, the properties defining the state identified by
the measurement can be fully assign to any of the individual physical object
from the ensemble. Note that one may identify singularly distributions as
solutions for the state functions (i.e. the system has a definite position, etc.),
but these represent mere ideal cases whose meaning is that one may increase
unlimitedly the precision of measurement.
III. Quantum mechanics in the sharp measurement in-
terpretation
Quantum mechanics needed another mathematical representation from
the point of view of measurement formalism. The states are represented
by positive trace-class operators ρ on a separable Hilbert space H, while
properties seemed to be represented by projector operators p on the closed
subspaces of H. Defining the counterproperty p˜ as the orthogonal comple-
ment p⊥ and identifying logical conjunction of properties with the projector
on the intersection of the corresponding subspaces, one may see that all these
properties are sharp ones: p ∧ p˜ = O [2].
For any state there are many self-adjoint operators, that may define it
completely. By spectral theorem, to these self-adjoint operators correspond
spectral measures whose ranges are the collections of properties (projectors)
which, by the upper definition, defines an observable. Two projectors (sharp
properties) are coexistent if and only if they commute:
p1 · p2 = p2 · p1
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Also, in quantum mechanics one has to define the system as an ensemble
of identically prepared physical (micro-)objects. For any complete observ-
able there exist an experimental procedure which assigns to every projector
from the range of the spectral measure a filter, so that an individual object,
interacting with it, will pass or not; consequently the corresponding sharp
property would be true, or false. Note that for another individual object the
answer need not be the same; when the answer is always true or always false
the property is said to be real for that state.
Some projector P1 may not belong to the range of the spectral measure
of any other complete observable where P2 is present. So, there exist non-
coexistent properties in quantum mechanics. The filters corresponding to
such non-coexistent properties cannot be built up together. This is the case
of properties related to non-commuting operators, known as complementary
observables. Consequently, the experimental procedures corresponding to
two sharp complementary observables cannot be built up together simulta-
neously. Heisenberg had been the first who investigated the result of two
consecutive non-coexistent measurements, and obtained an euristical rela-
tion (related to a similar one from the wave theory), which sounds like a
relation obtained by independent means from the mathematical formalism
of the quantum theory. The first is known as Heisenberg relation, while the
later as Robertson’s [3]:
∆A ·∆B >
~
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This similarity was, at that time, the single reason to assign the signif-
icance of imprecision in measuring an observable to the second order sym-
metric moment of it, i.e. ∆A, ∆B. Nevertheless, this is the real significance,
but the sharp version of the quantum formalism was not able to produce the
proof, and this was the standpoint for a lot of conceptual confusions.
Briefly, if one can ”see” the world only by sharp properties, reality has to
be split in complementary sub-realities, each giving us full access unless we
totally disregard the other sub-realiti(-es). Nevertheless, this kind of knowl-
edge has to be complete, because one can fully find the state of the system.
This claiming has challenged A. Einstein scientific realism who proved [4]
that (sharp) quantum theory cannot be simultaneously: real, causal, local
and complete[5]. Many scientists interpreted Einstein’s criticism as a con-
scription for finding a classical-type (hidden-variable) theory, which was in-
tended to fill the presumable incompleteness of quantum theory. Nevertheless
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a theorem due to J.S. Bell [6] followed by experimental verifications [7] con-
firmed that predictions of quantum theory for sharp observables are in perfect
concordance with physical reality, contrary to hidden-variable-classical-type
theories.
IV. Quantum mechanics in the unsharp measurement
interpretation
There were many attempts to solve these problems by giving up the
reality, causality or locality conditions, contrary to Einstein views, and to
common scientific sense, too. By the upper presentation, it is clear that one
has another solution for Einstein incompleteness problem, i.e., giving up the
sharpness condition. Indeed, this renunciation is a quite natural one: by
the M. Born interpretation, the sole quantity subject to direct experimental
verification is the probability:
w = Tr(ρ · p)
Of course is subject to the condition:
0 ≤ w ≤ 1 (1)
which corresponds in the set of the projectors to:
O ≤ p ≤ I (2)
Relation (2) is a necessary and sufficient condition for (1), but is not a
necessary condition for p to be a projector. Indeed, there exist more general
operators, called effects, which obey relation (2) and can stand for generalized
properties (E. Davies and C. Helstrom were the first who introduced [8]
this notion. Afterwards, the topic was rigurosly grounded by G. Ludwig
[9], and developed by E. Prugovecki, S. Gudder, etc.). One may define the
counterproperty:
p˜ = I − p (3)
This is not, generally, an orthocomplement, because the conjunction need
not necessarily exist, and if it exist, it is not necessarily O[2]. The opera-
tor 1
2
· I is called semitransparent effect. The effects which are neither less
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than the semitransparent effect nor greater than it, are called regular effects.
These regular effects correspond to the most general notion of property. The
complementation (3) is a kind of orthocomplementation in the set of regular
effects, i.e., regular effects are sharp ones in this sense (of course they are not
real sharp ones). Now, one may define a complete unsharp observable by a
collection of effects, which completely defines the state. Two unsharp proper-
ties are coexistent if there exist a complete observable, which contains both of
them (of course, it has to be an unsharp one). In general, there does not exist
any self-adjoint operator corresponding to an unsharp observable. Indeed,
instead of the spectral (projectorial) measure of the sharp observable, here
one has a positive- oprerator-valued measure (POVM), which cannot define,
by itself, a self-adjoint operator, but only a maximal symmetric operator.
A POVM F can be obtained by smearing a projectorial measure E:
F (X) =
∫
Ω
w(X, λ) · dEλ
where Ω is the space of the measurement outcomes, X is a Borel set on and
is a measurable function on for fixed X and a probability measure on the
Borelians class for fixed λ [2] . The smearing operation induces some de-
gree of uncertainty, which is due to the absence of sharply defined criteria of
ascribing numerical values to the equivalence classes produced by measure-
ment process. Also, POVM may come out in the theory of open systems
and, consequently, in the theory of quantum measurements.
A theorem due to Neimark ensures the extension of any closed maximal
symmetric A operator acting on H to a selfadjoint one acting on ♥H ⊃ H and,
consequently, of any POVM to a projectorial one. However, this extension is
not unique, which means that one cannot state the sharp version of Quantum
Theory as a fundamental one, able to produce, via smearing processes, partic-
ular unsharp cases. By the contrary, reality is itself fundamentally unsharp,
while the sharp situations are available only for gedanken-experiments.
The conceptual problems of Quantum Theory are, most of all, related to
such gedanken-experiments. The genuine role of such ”experiments” was to
clarify the concepts of the new theory vs. those of the classical mechanics.
(The later have been constructed by similar procedures; e.g., the idea of a ma-
terial point moving without constraints comes from a gedanken-experiment
invented by Galilei). Unfortunately, as we shown upwards, the expected
conceptual clarification did not come.
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It was stated upwards that from the formal theory of (experimental) mea-
surements one yields the statistical character of the concept of system. In
Classical Physics this does not make any harm, because all definable proper-
ties are mutually coexistent, so one can fully assign them to any individual
object described by the system. By the contrary, in Quantum Physics this
cannot be done, so its concepts seem to bear a kind of incompleteness. Un-
fortunately, there exist a great reluctance against the idea of incompleteness
of the scientific knowledge: a good theory has to offer a complete knowledge,
even at risk of changing the meaning of the word ”complete”. This reluctance
is closely related to the deep origins of the modern (experimental) physics,
which stays in the Middle Age occidental monasteries. Their new spiritual
perspective, contrary to the Orthodox Christian one, proclaimed (implicitly),
for the first time in the human history, a kind of ”God’s death”: God is far
away, and the world is all ours! So, we can handle it as we want, because
God let us; from here, one yields the inquisitorial method, which later be-
came the experimental method: the subject (of knowledge) owns a kind of
pre-knowledge (some information about some witchcraft vs. a theory to be
tested), while the object (of knowledge) has to obey to rules of the subject,
i.e. to answer his pre-conceived questions (what kind of witchery he had
done vs. what definite property it posses). Unsharpness is a way of sparing
the completeness taboo, i.e. a way which preserves the experimental method
(restricting to regular effects is very important!). Nevertheless, one may con-
ceive a Physics beyond the experimental method, which is David Bohm’s
approach to a hidden variable theory [10]. But, unfortunately, Bohm’s ap-
proach is undermined by the same sin as the experimentist approach [11].
The latter imposes a verifiable unsharp structure to reality, but the method
itself is not (meta-)verifiable, while the former tries to change the method (by
changing the immutable linguistic form of Quantum Theory as a universal
theory), making it (meta-)verifiable, but plays, unavoidable, with imposed
unverifiable sharp structures.
The Occam’s razor tells us that unsharp measurement interpretation of
quantum theory is, for the moment, the most appropriate way to understand
fundamental physics these days.
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